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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The Brief of Appellee Sullivan-Schein Dental Co. ("Sullivan") sets 
forth no disagreement with the "Issues Presented for Review" Section of 
Petitioner Susan Carter's ("Carter") principal Brief, nor has Sullivan 
disputed that such issues were sufficiently preserved in the record. 
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However, Sullivan's Brief contains a separate Statement of Issues Presented 
for Review, which substantially deviates from Carter's statement of the 
issues. Sullivan's statement of the issues omits some of the issues raised by 
Carter, and misstates Carter's First Issue.1 Therefore, Carter submits that 
her statement of the "Issues Presented for Review" more fully and accurately 
sets forth the relevant issues in this Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The "Statement of the Case" Section of Sullivan's Brief, at page 5, 
includes the following misstatement of fact: 
Carter was involuntarily terminated on March 25,1998 after 
two co-workers complained on separate occasions that she had 
violated a Sullivan-Schein company directive that prohibited a 
sales representative from soliciting ("poaching") an account not 
assigned to them. 
1
 Sullivan phrases the First Issue as: "Whether the Board acted within its 
statutory discretion in substituting its findings and conclusions for those of 
the Administrative Law Judge." (Sullivan's Brief, page 1). However, Carter 
does not dispute that the Board generally has authority to substitute its 
findings and conclusions for those of the ALJ. Carter contends that the 
Board exceeded its authority by considering arguments that had not 
previously been raised in the case, and by failing to consider the credibility 
determinations made by the ALJ. 
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There is no evidence in this case that two coworkers accused 
Carter of "poaching." The only alleged incident of poaching by Carter 
occurred when she communicated with Dr. Clegg's office, after it was 
assigned to sales representative Melanie Bingham ("Bingham"). The 
circumstances involving that incident are set forth within Carter's principal 
Brief, at pages 15-19. 
The other significant incident in this case—which directly preceded 
Carter's termination of employment— involved the Heritage Dental account. 
However, It is undisputed that the Heritage Dental account was assigned to 
Carter at the time of her termination. It is true that Carter's supervisor, 
Joseph Sheutzow ("Scheutzow"), falsely claimed, as the basis for Carter's 
termination, that Heritage Dental was not assigned to Carter. However, it is 
also undisputed that Schetzow knew Heritage Dental was assigned to Carter 
at the time of her termination. Heritage Dental was on Carter's run list, and 
Carter told Scheutzow that Heritage Dental was her account at the time of 
the termination. (Brief of Petitioner, Statement of Facts, Paras. 34-47). 
Carter even offered to show Scheutzow her run list in order to prove that 
Heritage Dental was her account, which Scheutzow refused. (Brief of 
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Petitioner, Statement of Facts, Para. 44). Scheutzow's blatantly false 
assertion cannot reasonably be described as a complaint by a co-worker that 
Carter called on an account that was not assigned to her. 
There was only one occasion on which Carter was accused by a co-
worker of calling on an account that was not assigned to her, i.e., the Dr. 
Clegg account. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although Sullivan's Brief contains a lengthy Statement of Facts 
section, it sets forth no disagreement with the Statement of Facts section of 
the Brief of Petitioner. Sullivan's Statement of Facts contains the following 
inaccurate or incomplete allegations: 
1. Sullivan's Brief states at page 8 that Parke Simmons 
("Simmons") and Blaine Brown ("Brown") exercised no supervisory control 
over Carter. However, the undisputed evidence in this case reflects that 
Simmons and Brown exercised informal supervisory control over the sales 
representatives, including Carter, during Scheutzow's frequent absences. In 
The Majority of the Appeals Board did not even mention the blatant 
falsity of the reason that was given for Carter's termination in its decision in 
this case. 
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fact, the portion of Bingham's testimony that is cited by Sullivan supports 
this conclusion. (Bingham Testimony, March 27,2003 Transcript, pp. 267-
269). The ALJ's Findings and Conclusions contain a detailed analysis of 
this issue. (Appendix at 7). The Majority of the Appeals Board held that: 
"Simmons and Brown would have no supervisory authority over Ms. 
Carter." (Appendix at 28). However, the Majority of the Appeals Board did 
not mention the possibility of informal authority, or address any of the facts 
referenced by the ALJ on this issue. 
2. Sullivan's Brief states at page 8 that Carter never contacted 
Sullivan's Vice President of Human Resources, Leonard David ("David") in 
regard to any alleged retaliation. This is true. However, Carter repeatedly 
complained to Sullivan's Director of Human Resources, Gary Anderson 
("Anderson") concerning retaliation. (See Carter's Statement of Facts, 
Paras. 33,48.) Carter also complained to Sullivan's President of the North 
American Dental Group, James Stahly ("Stahly") concerning retaliation in 
connection with her termination. (See Carter's Statement of Facts, Para. 49). 
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3. Sullivan's Brief states at page 13: "Carter was the subject of 
three separate complaints from co-workers involving predatory behavior." 
This allegation is false. 
The alleged "three separate complaints" referred to by Sullivan 
include Dr. Clegg's account and the Heritage Dental account. As discussed 
within the preceding "Statement of the Case" section hereof, the Heritage 
Dental incident cannot feasibly be described as "predatory behavior" on the 
part of Carter, because she simply called on her own account. 
The third alleged complaint regarding "predatory behavior" referred 
to by Sullivan involved the account of Dr. Wesley Brooks ("Dr. Brooks"). 
However, it is undisputed that Dr. Brooks' account, like the Heritage Dental 
account, was assigned to Carter at the time she called upon it. (Butler 
Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 242-243; Scheutzow Testimony, 
March 28,2003 Transcript, p. 232). Dr. Brooks' account constituted a 
"crossover," i.e., it was assigned to both Carter and Butler after the merger. 
Therefore, Carter had as much right to call upon Dr. Brooks' account as did 
Butler, and her calling upon the account cannot reasonably be described as 
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"predatory." It is undisputed that Carter received no discipline for calling on 
Dr. Brooks' account. (Scheutzow Testimony, June 10,2003 Transcript, pp. 
67-68; Appendix at 285). 
In an attempt to make Carter's contact with Dr. Brook's office appear 
culpable, Sullivan's Brief alleges that Carter presented herself to Dr. Brooks 
as "the Sullivan-Schein sales representative to the exclusion of Butler.'''' 
(Brief of Appellee, page 14)(emphasis added). There is no evidence that 
Carter presented herself to Dr. Brooks as Sullivan's exclusive sales 
representative, nor has that allegation previously been made. 
ARGUMENT 
I. MARSHALLING OF THE EVIDENCE. 
Sullivan's Brief, at pages 20-23, asserts that Carter failed in her 
obligation to marshal the evidence. However, Sullivan has not identified a 
single fact, inference, or argument relied upon by the Majority of the 
Appeals Board that Carter failed to address in her Brief. The Brief of 
Petitioner at pages 28-32 sets forth each argument and item of evidence that 
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the Appeals Board relied on in making its decision. 
Sullivan further asserts that Carter failed to identify the "fatal flaw" in 
the evidence relied upon the Majority of the Appeals Board. (Appellee's 
Brief, page 23). Carter believes that her Brief clearly identifies several such 
fatal flaws, specifically: 
1. The Appeals Board exceeded its statutory authority by relying 
upon arguments that had never previously been raised in the case; 
2. The Appeals Board failed to apply the appropriate legal 
standard; 
3. The Appeals Board failed to consider the credibility 
determinations made by the ALJ; and 
4. The evidence relied upon by the Appeals Board, as a whole, 
does not support its decision. 
Each of these "fatal flaws" has been raised as an issue within the Brief 
of Petitioner. 
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II. THE APPEALS BOARD EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY IN 
CONSIDERING ARGUMENTS THAT WERE NOT 
PREVIOUSLY RAISED IN THE CASE. 
Sullivan does not dispute that the scope of review of the Appeals 
Board is limited by Utah Code Section 34A-l-303(4)(c), which states: 
The commissioner or the Appeals Board may base its decision 
on: 
(i) the evidence previously submitted in the case; or 
(ii) on written argument or written supplemental 
evidence requested by the commissioner or Appeals 
Board. 
Further, Sullivan does not dispute that, under Section 34A-l-303(4)(c), 
the Appeals Board may not base its decision upon arguments that were not 
previously raised in the case. 
Carter contends that the decision of the Appeals Board 
substantially relied upon two arguments that were not previously raised in 
the case, specifically: 
(1) that Sullivan's "prompt and appropriate action" in response to 
Carter's letter negated a finding of subsequent retaliation, and 
(2) that Sullivan's failure to investigate the details of the complaints 
against Carter was "most reasonably attributable to: (1) wide-ranging 
responsibilities of Sullivan managers; 2) disorganization and 
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confusion engendered by the merger; 3) the company's paramount concern 
for the continuity of its newly combined sales force; and 4) the repetitive 
nature of the complaints about Ms. Carter's conduct." (Appendix at 32). 
Significantly, Sullivan's Brief does not dispute that these points were 
first raised by the Appeals Board in its decision. Sullivan's only response on 
this issue is to assert that the above-stated points constitute "facts" rather 
than "arguments" and were, therefore, properly considered by the Appeals 
Board. 
The distinction between "facts" and "arguments" is not always 
apparent, but it is reasonably clear in the present case. Specifically, it is an 
undisputed^zef in this case that Sullivan took prompt action in response to 
Carter's initial discrimination complaint. However, to infer that, because of 
that prompt action, Sullivan did not subsequently engage in retaliation 
against Carter is not a fact—it is an argument or legal conclusion. 
Moreover, it is an argument that Sullivan never raised prior to the decision 
of the Appeals Board. Even now, Sullivan does not assert that such a 
conclusion is warranted. (See Appellee's Brief, pages 32-33). Sullivan 
merely asserts that it is a fact, not an argument. 
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Similarly, it is an undisputed^c/ in this case that Sullivan failed to 
involve its Human Resources Department in either of the two disciplinary 
actions that were taken against Carter. It is also an undisputed fact that, 
under Sullivan's Discipline Policy, Human Resources was required to be 
involved in all disciplinary actions. It is also an undisputed fact that 
Sullivan experienced substantial confusion due to the merger at the time of 
Carter's termination. 
The Appeals Board's conclusion that Sullivan failed to involve its 
Human Resources Department because of the confusion caused by the 
merger might be construed as a finding of fact, if Sullivan had ever made 
such an argument or submitted evidence in support thereof. However, at no 
time prior to the Appeals Board's decision did Sullivan ever assert that its 
failure to involve Human Resources was due to confusion caused by the 
merger, or any of the other reasons that are cited by the Appeals Board. Nor 
did Sullivan offer any evidence in support of such a conclusion. 
Sullivan's Brief strenuously argues, at pages 33-37, that the merger 
was confusing, that its managers did have wide-ranging responsibilities, etc. 
However, this argument misses the point. Sullivan never asserted any of 
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these facts as the reason for its failure to involve Human Resources in 
Carter's termination. The connection between Sullivan's failure to involve 
Human Resources and the confusion caused by the merger, etc. constitutes 
an argument or conclusion that was first made by the Appeals Board in its 
decision.3 
These "new arguments" were critical to the decision of the Appeals 
Board. Without them, the decision cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the 
decision of the Appeals Board should be reversed, and the decision of the 
ALJ should be reinstated. In the alternative, the case should be remanded to 
the Appeals Board for a decision that does not rely upon arguments that 
were not raised by the parties during the case. 
3
 Carter's characterization of the Appeals Board's decision on this 
issue as an "argument" rather than a factual finding is supported by the 
language used by the Appeals Board. The Appeals Board stated that 
Sullivan's "failure to investigate the details of the complaints against Ms. 
Carter is most reasonably attributable to" the listed factors. (Appendix at 
32)(emphasis added). Notably, the Appeals Board did not state that such a 
conclusion was based upon the evidence presented in the case. The Appeals 
Board simply surmised that such a conclusion was "most reasonable." 
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III. THE APPEALS BOARD FAILED TO APPLY THE PROPER 
LEGAL STANDARD IN DETERMINING CARTER'S 
RETALIATION CLAIM. 
Carter contends that the Appeals Board effectively imposed two legal 
requirements upon Carter that are not supported by controlling legal 
authority. First, that Carter prove Sullivan failed to take prompt and 
effective remedial action in response to her underlying discrimination 
complaint in order to establish her claim of retaliation. Second, that Carter's 
underlying discrimination complaint allege contemporaneous acts of 
discrimination in order to support a claim of retaliaiton. 
Sullivan's sole response on this issue is to assert that the Appeals 
Board did not impose these two factors as elements of Carter's claim, but 
only as evidence on the element of causation. (Brief of Appellee, pages 27-
30). Sullivan also generally asserts that the Appeals Board properly 
considered these factors on the issue of causation, although Sullivan 
provides no analysis or authority in support of such assertion. 
It is true that the Appeals Board presented its consideration of these 
issues within its analysis of the causation element. (Appendix at 31-32). 
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However, Carter submits that these issues are more properly characterized as 
additional elements that the Appeals Board imposed upon Carter, for the 
following reasons: 
First, an employer's failure to take prompt and effective remedial 
action is a recognized element of claims alleging protected class 
discrimination. Curran v. AMI Fireplace Co.. No. 04-1362 (10th Cir. 2006); 
Hirase-Doi v. U.S. West Communications. 61 F.3d 777 (10th Cir. 1995). 
Sullivan acknowledges this rule on page 29 of its Brief.4 It would be 
inconsistent to make prompt and effective remedial action an element of 
protected class discrimination claims, but only a factor relating to causation 
in retaliation cases. 
Second, the rule adopted by the Appeals Board—that an employer's 
prompt response to an underlying discrimination complaint negates or 
diminishes an inference of subsequent retaliation, would have such far 
reaching consequences that it would, for all practical purposes, create an 
additional element, or at least substantially modify the causation element, in 
all retaliation cases. The Appeals Board did not indicate that its application 
4
 Specifically, Sullivan acknowledges that an employer's prompt and 
effective remedial action constitutes an affirmative defense in discriminatory 
harassment cases. Sullivan never alleged such an affirmative defense in this 
case. 
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of the prompt and effective remedial action rule is limited to the present 
case. The Appeals Board has adopted a far-reaching new rule that 
substantially alters the requirements for proving retaliation claims. If the 
decision of the Appeals Board in this case is affirmed, it may reasonably be 
expected that claimants in future retaliation cases will be required to prove 
their employers failed to take prompt and effective remedial action in 
response to their underlying discrimination complaints. 
The same analysis applies to the second factor cited above. An 
employee's involvement in protected opposition to discrimination is an 
established element in retaliation claims. However, to Carter's knowledge, 
no court has suggested that the protected opposition has to be to 
contemporaneous discrimination in order to receive protection against 
retaliation. Such a rule would substantially modify the "protected 
opposition" element in all cases where the underlying discrimination might 
be considered non-contemporaneous. The Appeals Board did not suggest 
this rule is limited to the present case. It has effectively modified the 
"protected opposition" element through the guise of its causation analysis. 
Unless this rule accurately states the law within the State of Utah, the 
decision of the Appeals Board should be reversed. 
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IV. THE APPEALS BOARD FAILED TO CONSIDER THE 
FINDINGS OF THE ALJ AS TO CREDIBILITY. 
Sullivan does not dispute that the decision of the ALJ in this case was 
substantially based upon credibility determinations. (See Brief of Appellee, 
pages 23-26). Nor does Sullivan dispute that the Majority of the Appeals 
Board completely disregarded the credibility determinations of the ALJ. In 
fact, the Appeals Board did not even mention credibility as an issue in the 
case. 
Sullivan seems to argue that the Appeals Board was within its rights 
to simply disregard the credibility findings of the ALJ in this case. 
However, such position is contrary to this Court's ruling in Vali 
Convalescent and Care Inst, v. Div. of Health Care Financing. 797 P.2d 438 
(Utah App. 1990). In Vali Convalescent, a DOH hearing officer determined 
that Vali had not intended to settle its claim for interest allegedly owed to it 
by DOH. Such determination was substantially based upon the hearing 
officer's assessment of the witnesses' credibility. 
Upon review, the hearing officer's decision was reversed by the 
Division's Executive Director. The Executive Director purported to adopt 
the findings of the hearing officer, but substituted her own factual 
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conclusions which led to a different result. The Executive Director did not 
explain her reasons for reaching a different conclusion than the hearing 
officer. Vali Convalescent 797 P.2d at 445. 
Upon appeal, this Court first reviewed the Utah case precedents and 
found them to be inconclusive. Vali Convalescent. 797 P.2d at 445-446. 
This Court then reviewed two cases from other jurisdictions. First, the Court 
quoted Dep't of Health and Welfare v. Sandoval. 742 P.2d 492 (Idsiho App. 
1987), as stating: 
[C]ommon sense indicates that in weighing the reasonableness 
of the Commission's findings, a court cannot wholly disregard 
the hearing officer's impressions drawn from first-hand 
exposure to the witnesses. The report of the hearing officer is 
part of the entire record embraced by judicial review. 
The Vali Convalescent court proceeded to describe the decision in 
Sandoval as follows: 
The [Sandoval] court did not suggest that the Commission had 
to accept the determinations of the hearing officer but that 
where credibility is crucial and where first —hand exposure to 
the witnesses may strongly effect the outcome, we think the 
Personnel Commission should not override the hearing 
officer's impressions unless it makes a cogent explanation of its 
reasons for doing so. Such an explanation is essential to 
meaningful judicial review, and it is a logical adjunct to the 
Commission's statutory duty to supplement its decision with 
findings of fact and Conclusions of law. Vali Convalescent 
797P.2dat447. 
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The Vali Convalescent court then discussed the decision of the 
United States Supreme Court in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 
474 (1951), which was relied upon by the Sandoval court, as follows: 
The Universal Camera Court stated that the examiner's findings 
should be considered as part of the whole record on appeal. It 
noted that the examiner's findings, which were based upon 
personal observation of the witnesses, might tend to negate the 
reasonableness of the contrary findings and Conclusions of the 
reviewing agency board. The Court found this to be 
particularly true where witness credibility was important to the 
case. Vali Convalescent. 797 P.2d at 447. 
In conclusion, the Vali Convalsecnt court stated that it was persuaded 
by Sandoval, and remanded the case to the executive director to make 
findings "sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
factual Conclusions.. .are reached." Vali Convalescent. 797 P.2d at 447. 
The court then stated: "Where, as here, the hearing officer's findings were 
apparently based to a large extent upon his credibility determinations, and 
the executive director took no live testimony, it is even more important for 
the executive director to adequately detail her reasons for reaching a 
different result." Qd).(emphasis added). 
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In the present case, the ALJ heard live testimony from numerous 
witnesses, much of which was disputed or conflicting. The ALJ then 
entered extensive findings of fact. It is undisputed that the ALJ's findings 
include several credibility determinations. Additionally, the ALJ found that 
Sullivan's professed reason for terminating Carter—soliciting accounts that 
were not her own—was pretextual, in that Sullivan's managers either knew 
that Carter was not soliciting such accounts, or deliberately avoided 
information that justified Carter's actions. (Appendix at 16-18). The ALJ 
also found that Carter was subjected to disparate treatment, i.e., that only 
Carter received discipline in relation to the crossover problems that, were 
experienced by all of the sales representatives. (Id). 
The Order of the Appeals Board provides no reason whatsoever for 
rejecting the ALJ's findings. It simply states: "The Appeals Board sets aside 
Judge La Jeunesse's findings of fact and enters the following findings." 
(Appendix at 27). After that, the Appeals Board makes no reference at all to 
the ALJ's findings of fact. The Appeals Board does not even mention any 
credibility issues. Nor does the Appeals Board address the ALJ's findings 
that Sullivan's professed reason for Carter's termination was pretextual. The 
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Appeals Board's Order states: "[We are] persuaded that Sullivan-Schein 
management likewise believed that Ms. Carter violated rules of conduct 
when it took action against her." (Appendix at 31). However, the Appeals 
Board provides no reasoning and cites no evidence in support of this 
conclusion. The Appeals Board completely disregarded all of the evidence 
upon which the ALJ relied in finding pretext, including the fact that the 
professed reason for the termination was blatantly false. The Appeals Board 
also completely overlooked the disparate treatment Carter received in 
relation to the crossover problems. 
Where a reviewing agency fails to make its own findings, it is 
presumed that it has adopted the findings of the administrative law judge. 
Vali Convalescent 797 P.2d at 446. The Appeals Board in the present case, 
having completely failed to address the ALJ's findings in regard to 
credibility, pretext and disparate treatment, should be presumed to have 
adopted such findings. Based upon those findings, the decision of the 
Appeals Board should be reversed and judgment entered in Carter's favor. 
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V. THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE DOES NOT SUPPORT 
THE DECISION OF THE APPEALS BOARD. 
Pages 42-49 of Carter's principal Brief describe in detail how the 
decision of the Appeals Board is not supported by substantial evidence in 
this case. Sullivan's Brief fails to respond to these arguments. 
First, Sullivan does not dispute that this Court should provide only 
limited deference to the decision of the Appeals Board in this case, due to 
the lack of Agency expertise, the split decision of the Appeals Board, and 
the ALJ's personal observation of the witnesses. 
The Majority of the Appeals Board based its decision in this case 
upon the following factors: 
(a) The Appeals Board found that Sullivan took "prompt and 
appropriate action" in response to Carter's letter, thereby indicating that her 
letter was not a motivating factor for her termination. (R. 934). Sullivan's 
Brief, at pages 28-29, asserts that the Appeals Board was justified in 
reaching this conclusion. However, neither Sullivan nor the Appeals Board 
has provided any analysis in support of such conclusion, or cited any 
supporting legal authority. 
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(b) The Appeals Board found that Carter's letter complaining of 
gender discrimination dealt with events several years past and at a different 
employer, thereby indicating that her letter was not a motivating factor for 
her termination. Sullivan's Brief, at page 30, asserts the Appeals Board was 
justified in reaching this conclusion. However, neither Sullivan nor the 
Appeals Board has provided any analysis in support of such conclusion, or 
cited any supporting legal authority. 
(c). The Appeals Board found that the sales representatives who 
complained about Carter did not know about Carter's letter. Carter argued 
in her principal Brief that this fact is immaterial, because only the state of 
mind of Sullivan's managers is relevant in this case. Sullivan's Brief does 
not address this issue. 
(d) The Appeals Board found that: "Sullivan-Schein management 
likewise believed that Ms. Carter had violated rules of conduct when it took 
action against her." (See Appendix at 31). However, the Appeals Board 
cited no evidence in support of this blanket assertion, and completely 
disregarded all of the extensive evidence to the contrary. 
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(e) The Appeals Board found that a complaint was made by Butler 
against Carter regarding the account of Dr. Brooks. Carter's principal Brief, 
at page 46, notes that Dr. Brooks' account was assigned to Carter, and that 
she never received any discipline for calling on his account. Sullivan's 
Brief, at pages 14-15, asserts that Dr. Brook's account was part of a pattern 
of "predatory behavior" on the part of Carter, but ignores the undisputed 
evidence that Carter was within her rights to call on such account, and that 
she received no discipline in relation thereto. 
(f) The Appeals Board found that Sullivan's failure to discuss the 
crossover complaints with Carter, or to involve Human Resources in 
Carter's disciplinary actions, were excused by the following factors: 
1) wide-ranging responsibilities of Sullivan-Schein managers; 
2) disorganization and confusion engendered by the merger; 
3) the company's paramount concern for the continuity of its 
newly combined sales force; and 4) the repetitive nature of the 
complaints about Ms. Carter's conduct." (Appendix at 31). 
Carter's principal Brief, at page 47, argues that there is no evidence of 
any connection between the listed factors and Sullivan's failure to discuss 
the crossover issues with Carter or Human Resources. Further, Sullivan 
never asserted any of such factors as an excuse prior to the Appeals Board's 
decision. Sullivan's Brief, at pages 34-37, asserts that the above-listed 
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factors are supported by evidence. However, Sullivan's argument misses the 
relevant point, which is the connection between the listed factors and 
Sullivan's failure to discuss the complaints with Carter or to involve Human 
Resources. There is no evidence of such a connection, nor did Sullivan 
assert that such a connection exists. Further, the Appeals Board did not 
consider evidence to the contrary. Specifically, the listed factors did not 
prevent Sullivan from taking prompt and effective action in response to 
Carter's initial complaint. Further, the listed factors would not reasonably 
prevent Sullivan management from discussing the issues with Carter or 
Human Resources. 
(g) Carter's principal Brief, at pages 48-49, notes that the Appeals 
Board substantially misconstrued Sullivan's policy regarding crossover 
accounts during the relevant time period. The Appeals Board's summary of 
such policy (Appendix at 28-29) fails to mention that the sales 
representatives were initially told to pursue "business as usual," i.e., call 
upon the same accounts that they had called upon before the merger. It was 
this policy that led to the crossover problems, and this policy remained 
substantially in effect until after Carter's termination. Sullivan's Brief does 
not address this issue. 
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Finally, Sullivan's Brief argues, at page 31, that the decision of the 
Appeals Board was based upon "multiple pieces of evidence," and that 
Carter has attacked only "individual pieces of the Board's findings." 
In fact, Carter has revealed the "fatal flaw" in each item of evidence 
upon which the Appeals Board relied in support of its decision. Sullivan has 
not identified any evidence or arguments that Carter failed to take into 
consideration. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing authorities, facts and arguments, Carter 
requests that the decision of the Appeals Board in this case be reversed, and 
that judgment be entered in favor of Carter. Carter also requests that she be 
awarded her costs and attorney's fees incurred in pursuing this Appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this L I day of April, 2006. 
Kenneth B. Grimes ^ ^ 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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